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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE THREE HUNDRED AND TWENTY-SIXTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 29 August 1967, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman:

U KYAW MIN

(Burma)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

<u>Brazil:</u>	Mr. C.A. de SOUZA e SILVA Mr. A. da COSTA GUIMARAES Mr. S. de QUEIROZ DUARTE
<u>Bulgaria:</u>	Mr. K. CHRISTOV Mr. B. KONSTANTINOV Mr. T. DAMIANOV
<u>Burma:</u>	U KYAW MIN
<u>Canada:</u>	Mr. E.L.M. BURNS Mr. J.R. MORDEN Mr. A. BERNIER
<u>Czechoslovakia:</u>	Mr. P. WINKLER Mr. V. VAJNAR Mr. J. STRUCKA
<u>Ethiopia:</u>	Mr. A. ZELLEKE Mr. B. ASSFAW
<u>India:</u>	Mr. V.C. TRIVEDI Mr. N. KRISHNAN Mr. K.P. JAIN Mr. R. ARORA
<u>Italy:</u>	Mr. R. CARACCILOLO Mr. G.P. TOZZOLI Mr. E. FRANCO Mr. F. SORO
<u>Mexico:</u>	Miss E. AGUIRRE
<u>Nigeria:</u>	Alhaji SULE KOLO Mr. B.O. TONWE
<u>Poland:</u>	Mr. J. GOLDBLAT Mr. E. STANIEWSKI Mrs. M. COSMA-KOMPANIEJCZEW

Romania:

Mr. N. ECOBESCO
Mr. O. IONESCO
Mr. C. GEORGESCO
Mr. A. COROIANU

Sweden:

Mr. A. EDELSTAM
Mr. M. STAHL
Mr. R. BOMAN

Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics:

Mr. A. A. ROSHCHIN
Mr. V.P. SUSLOV
Mr. V.V. SHUSTOV

United Arab Republic:

Mr. H. KHALLAF
Mr. A. OSMAN
Mr. O. SIRRY
Mr. M. SHAKER

United Kingdom:

The Rt. Hon. F. MULLEY
Sir Harold BEELEY
Mr. I.F. PORTER
Mr. D.J. MOSS

United States of America:

Mr. W.C. FOSTER
Mr. G. BUNN
Mr. C. GLEYSTEN
Mr. G. BREAN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. D. PROTITCH

Deputy Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Burma): I declare open the 326th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.
2. Mr. GOLDBLAT (Poland): A few days ago the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States of America tabled a draft treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (ENDC/193, 192). The event marks a turning-point in the six years of efforts aimed at stopping the spread of the most deadly instruments of war ever devised by man. Its significance, therefore, cannot be over-estimated.
3. The basic lines of the draft submitted to us are hardly a surprise or a novelty to anyone. As a matter of fact the main aspects of the non-proliferation issue have been studied and discussed extensively in this Committee, in the Disarmament Commission, in the course of successive sessions of the United Nations General Assembly, and in bilateral talks. Therefore let me point out, in all humility and without detracting in any way from the merits of our co-Chairmen who carry the main burden of negotiations, that we have all contributed, jointly and separately, to the elaboration of that important document.
4. It has become a practice in international dealings that the drafting of a treaty is preceded by an agreement establishing the principles upon which the treaty should be based and with which it should conform. Non-proliferation is not an exception in that respect. General Assembly resolution 1665 (XVI) of 4 December 1961 defined the general scope of the obligations to be contracted by the parties, while General Assembly resolution 2028 (XX) (ENDC/161) of 19 November 1965 enumerated the specific requirements to be met. We think it would be opportune at this juncture to examine how and in what way the rules set in those resolutions have been adhered to in the draft treaty.
5. As is well known, resolution 1665 (XVI) calls for --
 "... the conclusion of an international agreement containing provisions under which the nuclear States would undertake to refrain from relinquishing control of nuclear weapons and from transmitting the information necessary for their manufacture to States not possessing such weapons, and provisions under which States not possessing nuclear weapons would undertake not to manufacture or otherwise acquire control of such weapons".

The formula describes succinctly the essence of non-proliferation as a dual commitment: not to transfer and not to acquire. This very idea is contained in articles I and II of the draft treaty, which constitute its core -- its backbone, so to speak.

(Mr. Goldblat, Poland)

6. However, the mechanical inclusion of the wording of an international recommendation in an international treaty is not always feasible. A legally-binding instrument may need greater precision. Thus principle (a) of paragraph 2 of resolution 2028 (XX) stipulates that the treaty should be void of any loop-holes which might permit proliferation. We understand "loop-holes" to mean such gaps in the formulation of a treaty as would enable a party to it to circumvent the obligations undertaken by some confusing interpretation of what constitutes the object or the subject of those obligations.

7. The text under discussion excludes such a possibility. It states clearly that the ban covers not only nuclear weapons but also any nuclear explosive devices, irrespective of their destination. It unambiguously prohibits the nuclear-weapon States from transferring such weapons and devices, either directly or indirectly, to any recipient whatsoever, and also prohibits the non-nuclear-weapon States from receiving their transfer from any transferor whatsoever, as well as from manufacturing or otherwise acquiring them. I should like to draw attention to the prohibitive sense of the words "any", "whatsoever" and "otherwise", which allow of no exception.

8. The prohibition against assisting, encouraging or inducing any non-nuclear-weapon State to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or control over them, coupled with the interdiction against seeking or receiving any assistance in their manufacture, is but a complementary safety valve against any evasion.

9. Allow me now to proceed to principle (b) of resolution 2028 (XX), which calls for a balance of responsibilities and obligations of the nuclear and non-nuclear Powers to be embodied in the non-proliferation treaty. I believe we are all agreed that what is meant by balance in this context is not an exchange of one commodity for another over a bargaining counter. The objective of the treaty, as we are all aware, is to prevent an increase in the number of nuclear-weapon States. Consequently the obligations and the responsibilities of the parties should be specifically directed to that objective. The treaty would be lopsided and unbalanced if only one group of countries undertook to contribute to the achievement of its goal while others retained a free hand. However, that is not the case. The treaty will place restrictions on all the parties.

(Mr. Goldblat, Poland)

10. The restrictions, however, will be different in character, inasmuch as the status of each of the parties is different. The non-nuclear-weapon States will have the responsibility and the obligation not to acquire nuclear weapons, while the corresponding responsibility and obligation on the part of nuclear-weapon States will be not to share their nuclear potential with anybody under any circumstances. The commitments of the two groups of countries are equiponderant in the sense that they serve the same purpose: that of freezing the number of States in control of nuclear weapons. The balance of responsibilities and obligations has thus been built into the very body of the treaty.

11. Naturally, we do not consider the non-proliferation treaty as an end in itself and, to our knowledge, nobody does. It is rather a means to an end. This brings me to principle (c) under resolution 2028 (XX), according to which the treaty should be a step towards the achievement of general and complete disarmament and, more particularly, nuclear disarmament.

12. It goes without saying that the non-proliferation treaty, while containing and circumscribing the nuclear danger, will not remove it altogether. It remains our unquestionable duty to see to it that the threat which hovers over humanity is eliminated once and for all and that the security of all peoples is dependably safeguarded. In concluding a non-proliferation treaty we must therefore have a clear perspective of future disarmament undertakings. It is in this spirit that we welcome the intention, declared in the draft treaty, to halt the nuclear arms race at the earliest possible date, to cease the manufacture of nuclear weapons and to liquidate all the existing stockpiles of those weapons, as well as the means of their delivery. Our conviction that that is bound to happen is based not only on the solemn pledges made by the great Powers; it is founded on a firm belief that common sense must prevail, for the continued arms race, which becomes ever more absurd and counter-productive, poses a serious threat first and foremost to those who are engaged in it.

13. The lack of confidence between States is still the chief enemy of disarmament. A non-proliferation treaty, by easing international tension and dispelling at least some of the mistrust, will create a more favourable political climate which may facilitate progress and the implementation of further important measures. The speed and extent of the disarmament process will of course be largely influenced by the behaviour of States towards each other.

(Mr. Goldblat, Poland)

14. Disarmament has never been and will never be a matter of technicalities. Its aim is to eliminate war between States. It thus should become part and parcel of an international order based on peaceful co-existence along with the principles of non-intervention in the internal affairs of others, respect for the sovereignty and independence of States, and renunciation of the threat or use of force against their territorial integrity. Violations of those principles, in any region of the world, must give rise to concern and anxiety. They are pregnant with incalculable risks not only for individual countries but for the fate of mankind in general. Each so-called local conflict caused by such violations carries in itself seeds of global devastation.

15. No State, therefore, no government which has at heart the cause of peace can or should remain indifferent to the United States armed intervention in Viet-Nam, to the devastation of that country, to the escalating massacres of its population, to the methodical destruction of Hanoi, the capital city of the Democratic Republic of Viet-Nam. Bombing must stop; foreign troops must withdraw; the people of Viet-Nam have the right to shape their own destiny. Nor can Israel be allowed to derive any profit from its attack against the Arab States. There too, the interventionists must leave the occupied territories, and all the consequences of aggression must be eliminated. International law must be respected if international order based on peace, security and justice is to be ensured.

16. Principle (d) in resolution 2028 (XX) asks that the non-proliferation treaty be effective. That means that the observance of its provisions must be guaranteed and that the treaty should provide for control to guard against any violations of the obligation not to proliferate. The importance of that requirement to all parties is obvious. In particular, each non-nuclear-weapon State, in renouncing nuclear weapons, must receive assurances -- for the sake of its own security -- that all the other non-nuclear-weapon signatories will remain non-nuclear and that none of them will embark upon clandestine nuclear activities. Any doubts in that respect might arouse suspicions, accusations and recriminations which would defeat the very purpose of the treaty.

17. Control will be dealt with in article III, the wording of which is still being negotiated. The co-Chairmen are working on this problem, and we trust that it will be settled shortly.

(Mr. Goldblat, Poland)

18. The position of my delegation on the question of control is known. We consider that control should be international and reliable. It should be entrusted to the International Atomic Energy Agency, which is the only competent and authoritative body able to perform the task. The Agency has a membership of nearly a hundred States and has acquired experience in safeguarding peaceful nuclear activities. It applies a safeguard system which is generally accepted. Under the non-proliferation treaty, the Agency's system should be obligatory upon all the non-nuclear-weapon parties to the treaty, without exception or exemption for any such nation or group of nations.

19. Finally, principle (e) of the same resolution 2028 (XX), enunciating the right of States to conclude regional treaties in order to ensure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories, has been incorporated in the draft non-proliferation treaty in full. The reaffirmation of the need for and the usefulness of nuclear-free zones in a treaty on non-proliferation is not just a casual remark. The establishment of denuclearized zones by the withdrawal of nuclear weapons from the territories of the non-nuclear-weapon States in which they are stationed, or as a preventive measure in those areas where they are not stationed, would be a logical follow-up to the treaty prohibiting the spread of nuclear weapons. The sense of security of non-nuclear-weapon countries belonging to such zones would be reinforced if the nuclear Powers undertook never to use nuclear weapons against them.

20. Apart from the principles which were specifically endorsed and recommended by the United Nations, yet another principle has been elaborated in the draft treaty: that of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. The right of the parties to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with the basic provisions of the treaty is ensured in article IV.

21. However, the treaty goes even further than that. The nuclear Powers have actually committed themselves to sharing with the non-nuclear-weapon States the benefits of peaceful application of nuclear technology, including the so-called spin-off, providing scientific information and making available their services in the peaceful uses of nuclear explosive devices. That pledge of international co-operation, added to the intrinsic value of non-proliferation, is a welcome innovation in disarmament agreements and constitutes a valuable precedent.

(Mr. Goldblat, Poland)

22. To sum up, the text before us can be viewed as reflecting to the maximum degree possible the convergent trends of opinion which have revealed themselves in the course of the non-proliferation debate. Our deliberations have thus entered a crucial stage. We expect the blanks in the text to be soon filled in by the co-Chairmen. We pledge our co-operation in that respect.

23. The conclusion of the treaty will prevent the arms race from reaching new and frightening dimensions; it will reduce the danger of nuclear war breaking out by accident, error, miscalculation or design; it will open up new vistas for disarmament; it will ease tension and facilitate thereby the solution of international controversies; it will weaken the position of those forces which are committed to a policy of extreme nationalism and expansion; it will enhance the security of all. We think we are approaching the end of the long and arduous road leading to that goal.

24. Mr. CARACCILO (Italy) (translation from French): After the submission by the delegations of the United States and the Soviet Union of a draft treaty (ENDC/192, 193) to which all of us here have looked forward for so long, and shortly after the general statement made in the Committee by our Minister for Foreign Affairs (ENDC/PV.318), my delegation considers it opportune to take the floor once again in order to make a few preliminary comments. We should like first of all to express our gratitude to the Washington and Moscow Governments for the efforts made to answer the general expectations. We should like also to express our sincere congratulations to the representatives of those two great Powers on this first success which has crowned their personal activities. I am convinced that all these joint efforts will not fail to bear fruit and to influence in a positive way the future work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee aimed at the objectives common to all peace-loving peoples.

25. The drafts before us are indeed new texts if compared to the earlier ones, for they differ in several points from both the United States draft of 17 August 1965 (ENDC/152 and Add.1) and the Soviet draft of 24 September 1965 (ENDC/164). To understand this difference the present text has to be seen as the result of collective efforts and of numerous contacts between the governments concerned. That work of consultation, in which my country took an active part, reveals today all its usefulness, since it enabled several points of fundamental importance to be clarified.

(Mr. Caracciolo, Italy)

26. This applies, for example, to the problem of the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The importance of this problem is clearly seen from the fact that it has become the subject of a specific article in the new draft treaty -- an inclusion of which, for the moment, I shall only stress the importance without wishing to comment on the actual content of the article. The use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes should, in fact, be all the more encouraged and safeguarded since its place is in the context of the ever-growing technological gap. Moreover, it is in order to check this danger that my country has been led to put forward concrete proposals within the relevant institutions. Therefore the Italian delegation expresses its warmest appreciation to the authors of the draft treaty for the awareness and clear-sightedness which they have shown in this regard.

27. Other positive results of the joint activities in recent months can be found in the provisions of the preamble concerning both progress towards disarmament and nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. Lastly, and still refraining from any comments on the various provisions of the text, I wish to stress also the existence of a new article on revision of the treaty which leaves the door open for possible future amendments.

28. Nevertheless, it seems to me that some of our suggestions have not yet found a place in the text of the treaty. That applies to non-discrimination between the two categories of signatory countries, and to the problem of the security of the non-nuclear countries on which depends a more general adherence to the treaty. It also applies to the means to be adopted in order to avoid discouraging the development of European unity.

29. Quite obviously, however, the drafting of this text presented a number of difficulties. This is shown by the fact that the co-Chairmen have not yet succeeded in formulating article III on international controls. It is therefore natural to ask, in the most sincere spirit of co-operation and while seeking for a solution to this problem, whether, all things considered, it would not be wiser to defer this question to a later date. Indeed, if the difficulty of finding a satisfactory formula would prevent rapid progress in the negotiations, the decision to defer this difficulty might perhaps facilitate the conclusion of a treaty.

(Mr. Caracciolo, Italy)

30. Moreover, while fully realizing the importance of the article on controls, one cannot help thinking that in September 1965, when the Soviet Union submitted a draft treaty, the possibility of not proposing the immediate application of this article had already been envisaged. Therefore it seems that an agreement even without the control clause would nevertheless be an event of fundamental importance, a real advance along the road to disarmament. The Italian delegation does not intend to put forward any specific proposals on this subject; it wishes merely to suggest a subject for reflection in order to quicken the procedure for the conclusion of a treaty.

31. Nevertheless, we believe that it is premature at the moment to undertake a thorough analysis of the text. On the one hand, the treaty presupposes and provides for an article III of which we do not yet know the content; and this makes an overall assessment difficult. On the other hand, the Italian Government has undertaken to bring the draft submitted to us here to the attention of our Parliament. We shall therefore be unable to state precisely the Italian position on the whole of the treaty until this procedure has been completed. The Italian delegation will nevertheless continue, as in the past, to co-operate fully in the search for the best solutions likely to ensure the widest possible adherence to this treaty.

32. It was for this purpose that the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Italy, in his statement of 1 August in our Committee, alluded to a new measure aimed at increasing the interest of the non-nuclear countries in the treaty and at the same time at allaying some of their misgivings (ENDC/PV.318, paras.14 et seq.). Having now read the new text, we feel that the suggestion put forward by Mr. Fanfani remains fully valid. Indeed, some of the misgivings of the non-nuclear States towards the problem of the balance of obligations and that of the peaceful use of nuclear energy would undoubtedly be allayed if the nuclear countries considered the suggestion to make available to the non-nuclear countries which sign the treaty, periodically and in accordance with the suggested procedures, a part, even a modest one, of their fissile material to be used for peaceful purposes. It would thus be possible to foresee acceptance of the treaty by a greater number of States, to facilitate technological progress, and to make an effective contribution to the economic and social progress of the least-favoured section of mankind.

(Mr. Caracciolo, Italy)

33. Since we now have before us a concrete draft treaty, a link between nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy could be sought. This link could be found either by including the Italian suggestion in a provision of the treaty in words which, if necessary, we should be prepared to submit, or by converting it into a further draft agreement which would testify to the common will to advance along the road towards disarmament and the development of nuclear research for peaceful purposes.

34. Another way of facilitating acceptance of the treaty by the greatest number of States would perhaps be to give it a certain flexibility in either its duration or the machinery of its amendment. Such flexibility, provided that it did not hinder the successful conclusion of the negotiations, would make it possible to take account of the unpredictable results of technical progress and to adapt the treaty, without clashing, to the changing realities of the international community.

35. With the submission of the present draft our work enters a new phase. We hope that it may lead to positive results without further need to revert to the proposal put forward by Italy during the summer of 1965 at a difficult period of our work (ENDC/157). The Italian Government hopes that the interval until the end of this session may be employed in the most effective way to provide bearings for the forthcoming debates in the General Assembly so as to achieve the aim of resolution 2153/A (XXI):

"to bring to a conclusion a treaty ... which is acceptable to all concerned and satisfactory to the international community" (ENDC/185). No other phase could better express the hope and even the need of success in harmonizing the particular interests of States with those of all mankind.

36. I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for giving me the opportunity to make these few preliminary observations on the draft treaty which has been submitted to us.

37. Mr. MULLEY (United Kingdom): It is a privilege to follow the representatives of Poland and Italy, and I should like to thank them for their thoughtful and valuable contributions to our discussion. I shall try to take up in my own remarks some of the points they have made.

38. I should, however, like to begin by joining them and other representatives who have spoken previously in extending congratulations to our co-Chairmen on their achievement in submitting to us texts of the draft non-proliferation treaty (ENDC/192, 193), and to thank the co-Chairmen for their dedicated efforts which have

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

made this extremely important development possible. Much time and thought and very many speeches and resolutions have been directed to this end over several years; and I confess, as my colleagues will know, to having been impatient at our seeming lack of progress. Thus it is extremely satisfactory to be able to say now with conviction that the speedy conclusion of a non-proliferation treaty is now within our grasp, with the great benefit which, I believe, it will bring to all the nations of the world. The successful outcome of our deliberations can have a wider significance for the future of mankind than the subject-matter of the treaty itself, vitally important though that is, since it may put us back on the path to general disarmament on which we seemed to have made a promising start with the partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) but from which we seem to have been diverted in the last two or three years into a morass of indecision.

39. First of all, I should like to follow the examples of the representatives of India and Czechoslovakia at previous meetings and the representative of Poland today and look back at the antecedents to this measure of arms control.

40. At the meeting of the Committee on 25 July (ENDC/PV.316) the representatives of India and Czechoslovakia set out the historical background to the non-proliferation treaty as each saw that background. It is useful to look back, as Mr. Trivedi did, to the Baruch plan and to the discussions of the 1950s before the emergence of the idea of a non-proliferation treaty as a separate collateral measure of arms control. It was resolution 1665 (XVI) of December 1961, generally known as the Irish resolution -- to which the representative of Poland has drawn our attention again today -- which gave that idea its classical expression. That resolution, which the General Assembly adopted unanimously, gave a new impetus to the efforts to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. It implied a general acceptance of the view that, however desirable it would be to make progress on a broader front by associating non-proliferation in the sense of that resolution with other proposals, the difficulties in the way of such a package were too great, and it was more practical to isolate that one particular and obviously urgent measure and to obtain agreement on it.

41. It must have been tempting for the non-nuclear Government which sponsored that resolution, and its non-nuclear supporters, to include in the proposal a provision banning any further increase in the stockpiles of nuclear weapons -- that is, a provision forbidding any further production of them --; but they knew very well

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

that previous attempts to do so had run aground on the rock of verification. They hoped, as we hope now, that once the spread of nuclear weapons to additional countries had been stopped it would be easier to tackle the problem of further production on which the attention of the world would then be focussed. They may well have feared, as my Government fears now, that if the spread were not stopped by a separate non-proliferation treaty there would be no chance of stopping the nuclear arms race.

42. Our two co-Chairmen, in introducing the draft treaty, have explained the purpose of the preamble and the seven articles so far submitted. I will not follow them today in a systematic study of the text but will discuss it briefly under three aspects only: its effect on the security of all States, its effect on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and the place of the treaty in the scheme of nuclear disarmament.

43. First, with regard to security, I think I cannot do better than recall the arguments put forward by the representative of Poland at our meeting of 1 August (ENDC/PV.318, paras. 29 et seq.). Mr. Goldblat pointed out that the present nuclear-weapon States, and particularly the two most powerful, need fear no direct military threat to their security from a further spread of nuclear weapons. He then examined the effect of such a spread on the non-nuclear States in general and showed convincingly that the increased instability would reduce their security; that even a State which acquired nuclear weapons might well find that by doing so it had not increased but had actually diminished its security.

44. I find myself in substantial agreement with that analysis, since the military evaluation of nuclear capability goes much beyond the capacity to produce a nuclear bomb and includes a consideration of the character of the nuclear weapons available to a State as well as the means of delivery at its disposal. As we know, the problems in terms of sophistication and cost of the delivery system are as great as, or greater than, the problems of military nuclear technology itself.

45. Mr. Goldblat made the further point that it would be wrong to expect this particular treaty to solve completely the security problem of signatories. As long as weapons exist, especially nuclear weapons, there is the danger that they will be used in conditions of crisis and mutual suspicion. Spoken or unspoken, the threat of the use of nuclear weapons remains as long as the weapons themselves remain. As has already been said, the treaty is a vital step on the way to real disarmament. However, it is and must be only a first step forward, and it would be wrong to expect it to offer a final solution of the problem.

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

46. On the other hand, for any nation, the problem of its security is properly a vital consideration. In this context some non-nuclear Powers may feel that the loss of the option to make nuclear weapons may prove a source of weakness. Others may judge such fears to be groundless; but it is only right that everything possible should be done to set them at rest.

47. Both the co-Chairmen referred to that real problem in their speeches at our last meeting (ENDC/PV.325), and it is clearly very much in their minds. I hope that their continued study of that aspect of the treaty will lead to a solution which will prove generally acceptable. If it is not possible to provide assurances to enhance the security of non-nuclear signatories within the treaty itself -- and I understand the difficulties -- I hope it may be possible to do so, as the representative of the United States mentioned, within the framework of the United Nations.

48. At this point I should also mention the outstanding problem of safeguards. Both co-Chairmen explained that they were at present unable to place a draft of article III before us for consideration but that they were continuing their efforts to that end. In the meantime, I agree that there is no advantage in discussing that aspect of the matter in vacuo, and I hope very much that they will shortly succeed in presenting us with a text while in the Committee we hammer out the articles placed before us and, I trust, reach general agreement upon them. Time is not on our side. In the constructive atmosphere which prevails I am optimistic and believe a satisfactory safeguard formulation can be found. If I or my delegation can be of assistance to the co-Chairmen on that or any other matter, I hope they will not hesitate to call upon us.

49. Fears have also been expressed in recent months, both in our discussions and in the Press, that this treaty, which is designed to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons, will also have the effect of inhibiting the spread and the development of peaceful nuclear technology. No one ever intended at any stage that the treaty should have this secondary effect, which would clearly be irrelevant to its purpose. However, I believe that the discussions have served a useful purpose. They have shown that many of the particular fears were exaggerated or without foundation. The assurances which have been expressed by each of the nuclear-weapon States represented on this Committee should make it impossible for any of those States to adopt a restrictive attitude once a treaty comes into force, even if they wished to do so; and on past form, if I may say so, that would not appear to be their intention. I can say

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

categorically, as the representative of one of the nuclear-weapon States, that it is certainly not our intention. We now have in article IV of the draft before us, and in the preamble, clear and categorical language on that point. These provisions, as the representative of Italy has just pointed out, had no counterpart in either of the drafts which we considered last year (ENDC/152 and Add.1; 164), and their appearance now is a tribute to the value of the exchanges which have taken place here in the intervening period.

50. There remains the quite distinct problem of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes. The arguments on that have been presented and thoroughly discussed from both points of view. I do not think there is any difference of opinion on the basic fact that the technology of a device exploded, or designed to be exploded, for peaceful purposes is virtually identical with the technology of a weapon test. For that reason a treaty which permitted the unrestricted use of nuclear explosive devices for peaceful purposes would contain a serious loop-hole, which could fatally undermine its stability. To insist on such a provision would be to go against the considered and expert opinions of the great majority of States.

51. Such insistence, moreover, would amount to asking that a political advance of great importance, which could be made consistently with the full right of all States to participate in all benefits of peaceful nuclear technology, should be jeopardized for what is at present a hypothetical benefit. The expert opinions made available informally to members of delegations in the spring seemed rather sceptical about the practical prospects for peaceful explosions in the foreseeable future. We must not forget the enormous expenditure which a country embarking on its own programme would have to face. Nor has a way yet been suggested for reconciling some of the uses to which this technique might hypothetically be applied with the provisions of the partial test-ban Treaty.

52. It might also be suggested that the diversion of scarce resources of material and skilled manpower to a limited, costly and possibly fruitless endeavour, when the vast possibilities of reactor technology are there to be developed, does not at present seem likely to be an attractive option to any but the most wealthy Powers.

53. It has, moreover, been made abundantly clear by the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States that there is no question of any State being deprived of the benefits -- if it turns out that there are benefits -- of peaceful explosions.

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

As a result of the arrangements, the establishment of which could be agreed in response to the legitimate concern of non-nuclear States, those States would probably be better off economically than they could hope to be without such an agreement.

54. Finally, I should like to deal very briefly with the relevance of the treaty to the general question of disarmament. We all agree that the non-proliferation treaty is not an end in itself. We all share the intention that it should lead on to other measures to stop the nuclear arms race and to limit and reduce existing stockpiles. I believe the draft before us serves that purpose in three ways. First, a treaty concluded on this basis would contribute to that reduction in tension between the two most powerful nuclear-weapon States and their allies which is an essential prerequisite to any significant measure of arms control and disarmament. Second, the preamble makes it clear that this is not an isolated, final measure but is meant to lead to other agreements. Third, there is in article V the provision for a review conference which after a comparatively short time will give all signatories an opportunity to examine whether the purposes and provisions of the treaty are being realized.

55. We meet against a background of a world in tension, at a time when the development of anti-ballistic missiles threatens an increased impetus to the nuclear arms race and not its cessation. It is a responsibility for all of us to do what we can to abate the temperature; but it is, of course, particularly a responsibility for the two major nuclear Powers, represented here by our two co-Chairmen. I believe that they recognize their special responsibilities and that this draft treaty is a manifestation of their concern to do something positive to reduce the dangers of nuclear war.

56. The Soviet representative recalled at our last meeting the words of the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Mr. Kosygin, speaking at the United Nations General Assembly on 19 June, when he said:

"The nuclear age has created a new reality in questions of war and peace.

It has vested in the States a far greater responsibility in all that pertains to these problems". (A/PV.1526, p.6)

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

57. The President of the United States, in his moving statement circulated to us last Thursday, placed the issue clearly before us. He said:

"For more than twenty years, the world has watched with growing fear as nuclear weapons have spread.

"Since 1945, five nations have come into possession of these dreadful weapons. We believe now -- as we did then -- that even one such nation is too many. But the issue now is not whether some have nuclear weapons while others do not. The issue is whether the nations will agree to prevent a bad situation from becoming worse.

"Today, for the first time, we have within our reach an instrument which permits us to make a choice." (ENDC/194)

58. This treaty must be followed by further measures if we are, as the President said, to retain a capacity to design our fate rather than be engulfed by it. In this connexion I should again make clear the position of my own Government towards further measures of disarmament, which I confirmed in my previous speeches here. We stand for general and comprehensive disarmament. The Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary and my predecessor here, Lord Chalfont, have all made clear my Government's desire for and determination to work for agreements of the kind advocated so often in our discussions: for a freeze of nuclear delivery vehicles, for a cut-off of fissile material production, for a reduction of existing stocks, and for a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

59. My Government supports those measures as part of the general non-proliferation strategy and as a means of halting the arms race and reducing the stocks of weapons. We see this non-proliferation treaty as a first step in that process. We should, of course, be happy if all those measures could be embodied in simultaneous agreements and implemented together; but there is no one with any experience in this field, certainly no one around this table, who thinks that that is within the realm of practical possibility. To ask, therefore, for those additional steps to be taken now, or to delay the non-proliferation treaty because this or that desirable provision is not included, would in my judgement be to make the best the enemy of the good.

60. The treaty we are working on will not of course solve all problems of arms control or all problems of security; but it is a vitally important and indispensable step

(Mr. Mulley, United Kingdom)

on the road to real disarmament. The achievement of the treaty will also be a just return for the skill and patience of our co-Chairmen and all the representatives who have laboured here for so long to take a positive result to the First Committee in New York -- and, moreover, an augury of fruitful and, I trust, faster progress in the work at our future sessions.

61. I believe I can best summarize what I have been trying to say by asking all who desire to advance towards the effective control of nuclear armaments -- and that, I am confident, includes everyone around this table -- to consider which situation would offer them the greater hope: one in which the negotiation of a non-proliferation treaty had broken down or run into the sand; or one in which the conclusion of a treaty, however limited and however imperfect, had opened the way, and pointed the way, to further effort in this field.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 326th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of U Kyaw Min, representative of Burma.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Poland, Italy and the United Kingdom.

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 31 August 1967, at 10.30 a.m.

The meeting rose at 11.35 a.m.

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